I can't help but see Bush's sinisterly baby-faced new nominee for the CIA directorship as a vote of confidence in Rumsfeld. It looks to me as essentially re-affirming his support for the military side in the current struggle over who runs foreign policy in Washington -- the Pentagon or civilians. Which is to say, nothing I wouldn't have expected.
The end of the Times article on Hayden's ascension through/from the tarnished intelligence world does have an interesting quotation from a recent speech by the General:
In a February speech to an Air Force audience, General Hayden reflected on the epochal shift in intelligence targets from the big, powerful military targets of the cold war to the more elusive quarry of Al Qaeda.
He spoke almost nostalgically of old adversaries like Soviet forces in Germany.
"Remember those?" he said. "I miss those days. Those enemies were easy to find, hard to finish."
He continued, "Now, look at the targets of today, whether it's some idiot in a cave in Waziristan or rather small W.M.D. production facilities. They're easy to finish. They're just damn hard to find."
That bit about "rather small W.M.D. production facilities" could point at hypothetical Al Queda bomb labs...or it might be a reference to Iran. In which case, this passage from Seymour Hersh's recent piece on the subject is worth revisiting:
One of the military's initial option plans, as presented to the White House by the Pentagon this winter, calls for the use of a bunker-buster tactical nuclear weapon, such as the B61-11, against underground nuclear sites. One target is Iran's main centrifuge plant, at Natanz, nearly two hundred miles south of Tehran. Natanz, which is no longer under I.A.E.A. safeguards, reportedly has underground floor space to hold fifty thousand centrifuges, and laboratories and workspaces buried approximately seventy-five feet beneath the surface. That number of centrifuges could provide enough enriched uranium for about twenty nuclear warheads a year. (Iran has acknowledged that it initially kept the existence of its enrichment program hidden from I.A.E.A. inspectors, but claims that none of its current activity is barred by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.) The elimination of Natanz would be a major setback for Iran's nuclear ambitions, but the conventional weapons in the American arsenal could not insure the destruction of facilities under seventy-five feet of earth and rock, especially if they are reinforced with concrete.
There is a Cold War precedent for targeting deep underground bunkers with nuclear weapons. In the early nineteen-eighties, the American intelligence community watched as the Soviet government began digging a huge underground complex outside Moscow. Analysts concluded that the underground facility was designed for 'continuity of government' -- for the political and military leadership to survive a nuclear war. (There are similar facilities, in Virginia and Pennsylvania, for the American leadership.) The Soviet facility still exists, and much of what the U.S. knows about it remains classified. 'The "tell" ' -- the giveaway -- 'was the ventilator shafts, some of which were disguised,' the former senior intelligence official told me. At the time, he said, it was determined that 'only nukes' could destroy the bunker. He added that some American intelligence analysts believe that the Russians helped the Iranians design their underground facility. 'We see a similarity of design,' specifically in the ventilator shafts, he said.
A former high-level Defense Department official told me that, in his view, even limited bombing would allow the U.S. to 'go in there and do enough damage to slow down the nuclear infrastructure -- it’s feasible.' The former defense official said, 'The Iranians don’t have friends, and we can tell them that, if necessary, we'll keep knocking back their infrastructure. The United States should act like we're ready to go.' He added, 'We don't have to knock down all of their air defenses. Our stealth bombers and standoff missiles really work, and we can blow fixed things up. We can do things on the ground, too, but it's difficult and very dangerous -- put bad stuff in ventilator shafts and put them to sleep.'
But those who are familiar with the Soviet bunker, according to the former senior intelligence official, 'say "No way." You've got to know what's underneath -- to know which ventilator feeds people, or diesel generators, or which are false. And there's a lot that we don't know.' The lack of reliable intelligence leaves military planners, given the goal of totally destroying the sites, little choice but to consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons. 'Every other option, in the view of the nuclear weaponeers, would leave a gap,' the former senior intelligence official said. ' "Decisive" is the key word of the Air Force's planning. It's a tough decision. But we made it in Japan.'
I'm just going to close by noting what branch of the services Gen. Hayden hails from.
